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Mary Midgley s aim in "Brutality and Senti­
mentality" is to maintain that "the notion 
that it is sentimental to attribute feelings 
to animals is pretty confused, because it is 
a charge against the motives of the attri­
butors, not really against what they say."l 
Not unlike the argument in her Beast and Man 
(1978), Midgley's position here makes an --­
epistemologically bold assumption: it is just as plausible for one to say that he or 
she can identify feelings in nonhuman animals 
as it is to attempt the same feat with other 
humans. If, as is generally accepted, one 
has warrant for inferring from one's own 
experience the feelings of other humans, 
then a like inference about the feelings 
of nonhuman animals also properly can be 
made. 
Unfortunately, Hidgley skirt!! some basic 
issues; as a result, she does not make a 
persuas~ve case. It must be recognized that 
a challenge to human-centered thinking is 
an important issue in ph,ilosophy and theolo!F 
today; but for one to v~ew the problem of 'bru­
tality" and "sentimentality" as an ei"Jpirical 
one is to blur the distinction which obtains 
between activity and agency. Behavior can be 
observed and, at least in some ways, it can 
be measured empirically; but what would it 
mean to say that a "personality trait" is 
an empirical phenomenon capable of some kind 
of measurement?2 tVhat kind of "evidence" 
could be provided for a determination of the 
nature of one's motives in acting either kindly 
or cruelly toward any creature? How can one 
determine whether and to what extent one 
"distorts" reality either by refusing to adopt 
a sympathetic attitude toward nonhuman creatures 
or by projecting a "brutal" image onto them? 
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Midgley's argument begs a f·mdamental ques­-
tion: how does one know that different modes 
of existence (e.g., a human and a wolf) have 
experiences which are closely enough related 
to warrant inferences of the sort Midgley 
wishes to make? It is one thing to say that 
"notions like fear, anger, pleasure, etc., 
were not invented in or for an exclusively
human world .... they grew up in a thoroughly 
public world inhabited by many species ... "3; 
it is quite a different thing to conflate 
"notion" and "experience," and then to 
conclude from the above assertion about the 
publicity of fear, anger, and pleasure,
that "species solipsism is no more con­-
vincing than the personal kind."4 In order 
to make a convin. Lng argument, Midgley must 
show decisively tnat her pOpition does not 
"distort" reality; but, given the way she 
has decided to address this issue, it would 
seem that such a task is in principle impos­-
sible for her to realize. While Midgley's
intentions are without doubt laudable, her 
approach to the. problem of human-nonhuman 
relations cannot provide the results she 
seeks. Much more work remains to be done. 
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